The Avdiivka puzzle

On February 18th, the Washington Post referred to the recently captured city of Avdiivka as “strategic”. Is Avdiivka a strategic or pyrrhic victory for Russia? And is Russia’s significant commitment to its capture about the city itself, or the strategic leverage that comes with controlling it? I argue it is both. 

On February 17-18, Russian encirclement of Avdiivka yielded (questionable) results after 4 months of fighting - the most prolonged operation since capture of Bakhmut last year. Though the accounts of Russian losses (allegedly, tens of thousands of troops) tarnish the sparkle of this “achievement”, the completion of this objective alludes to Russia’s growing mastery of the opportunism factor and echoes the dangers of continued western hesitation to send equipment. Avdiivka is one in a series of opportunistic offensive operations launched in the “hesitation window” of western donors; multiple offensive engagements at once overwhelm Ukraine tactically, forcing them to overcommit remaining manpower and equipment while the EU squabbles over an agreement. Here, Russia does not actually pursue much operational gain; the goal is to use up as much Ukrainian defensive capacity as possible while the EU argues. ISW adds that Russia has not yet demonstrated a resolve to secure operationally significant gains or conduct rapid mechanized maneuver; Avdiivka was disproportionately costly and is, therefore, a pyrrhic victory. At least, that is the pragmatic assessment.  

On the other hand, Avdiivka’s capture symbolizes more than just a victory for the sake of capturing something: the city is a strategic steppingstone to controlling Donetsk, one of the regions Russia pledged to annex since the start of the full-scale invasion, and which must be kept as a critical prerequisite for Kremlin’s definition of “success”. Gradual advancement into the region opens up wider opportunities, like getting a land bridge to Crimea and controlling Crimea’s fresh water supply from the Dnipro River via the North Crimean Canal. That said, it remains unclear whether the destruction of coke and chemical plants by Russian troops will assist ‘russification’ post-annexation (since the region’s production capacity will pose no competition to Russian ‘alternatives’) or, adding to the monumental cost and resolve demanded by reconstruction of Mariupol and Bakhmut, will amount to an unsustainable investment and remain a wasteland for decades to come.  

The destruction of Avdiivka’s production potential is a double-edged sword both operationally and strategically. Russia’s approach so far – sporadic implementation of a 'scorched earth’ policy – lowers the chance that reconstruction will stem from a local impetus from regional budgets. The (hypothetical) man-made dependence of Donetsk on Russia’s economic condescension is a way of deterring future insurgencies; sabotaging Avdiivka’s economic self-sufficiency is part of the neo-colonial modus operandi of russification: control of employment, pay rates, working hours and conditions, as well as the distribution of key production areas across annexed territories, will converge Russia’s economic interests with private investment, intertwining and ‘normalising’  local population’ livelihoods with Russia’s funding. Further implying that soft colonialism is the alternative to sending little green men like in Crimea 2014, is a flabbergasting propaganda film about the housing market in Mariupol, released at the end of January 2024. The film, titled "Shock Prices for Apartments in Mariupol", was released in November on the ‘Mirnye’ (‘Peaceful’) YouTube channel; The project was a personal initiative of Regina Orekhova, a "military correspondent" for RIA Novosti. Two points in the video are particularly illustrative of later economic intertwining. The video asks: “Is it more profitable to invest in a "ruin" in order to sell it at a higher price when it is restored?” and “How to rent a business space here, how much does it cost?”, clearly aiming to bring Russians in to ‘settle’ and exploit the full freshness of the ripe “investment climate”.  

Avdiivka’s capture was more operationally significant than Bakhmut: a Ukrainian infantry platoon commander admitted it used to serve as a center for Ukrainian logistics. The Washington Post writes that some Ukrainian soldiers compared the fortress-like coke and chemical plants to Azovstal in Mariupol. Dozens of Ukrainians were taken prisoner at Azovstal, but “storming the coke plant… {would} not make sense,” said an Alpha drone pilot on the ground, which is why Ukraine decided to cease efforts to maintain it, saving manpower in response to Russia’s exploitation of the ‘hesitation window’ of European donors, suggested by ISW. In the end, Russia encircled the plant and pushed Alpha Unit (Ukrainian Security Service’s Center of Special Operations “A”) out – an important tactical improvement for the Russians since the unit used to rely on the abandoned chemical plant as a base to launch first-person view, or FPV, drones rigged with explosives.  

References:  

Iswkf. (n.d.). Russian offensive campaign assessment, February 18, 2023. ISW Blog. https://www.iswresearch.org/2023/02/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_18.html  

Russian offensive campaign assessment, February 1, 2024. Institute for the Study of War. (n.d.). https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2024  

Ukraine on verge of losing Avdiivka, strategic city long targeted ... (n.d.-a). https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/15/ukraine-avdiivka-oleksandr-syrsky-russia/  

What to know about Avdiivka as Russia claims control of Ukrainian ... (n.d.-b). https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/18/avdiivka-withdrawal-ukraine-russia-war/