Keeping the Balance: Central Asia and Russia’s War in Ukraine
Putin visited Uzbekistan in late May, a Kyrgyz court sentenced a man for speaking out against the war and a new law on media in Kazakhstan mandates increased Kazakh language broadcasting - anyone browsing the news coverage of Central Asia over the last weeks received mixed signals as to the evolution of Russian influence in the region within the larger framework of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Looking back on three decades of independence the lack of explicit support for the invasion on the part of Central Asian governments while not siding with Ukraine either is a continuation of a proven foreign policy strategy in a qualitatively different environment after February 2022. The region is surrounded by large and powerful countries, most prominently Russia and China. To adapt to that reality, the five countries have historically pursued a multi-vector foreign policy which balances the interests of neighbouring countries and global powers, playing them out against each other and/or pledged neutrality and non-alignment. Russia’s war has increased the attention Central Asia has received internationally due to its significance as a transit region facilitating sanctions evasion and part of the middle corridor guaranteeing East-West trade between China and Europe.
After the war began, the strategy of balancing great powers did not fundamentally change. Even before February 2022, the nations of Central Asia did not recognize the territories claimed by Russia in Georgia and Ukraine. Their initial reactions after the full-scale invasion were characterized by abstentions in the United Nation’s vote condemning the aggression with Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz officials speaking out for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Domestically, they allowed small-scale support for Ukraine among the population such as humanitarian aid collection. Even though the Kyrgyz government took a harsher stance on anti-war protests, no state in the region openly supported the invasion. Over the past two years the war allowed Central Asian governments increased room to maneuver politically but has simultaneously highlighted enduring vulnerabilities and dependencies on Russia.
The most salient trend in the region remains the substitution of Russian influence for Chinese power. While that is a broad oversimplification it is evident that the traditional division of labour with Russia as the main external security provider in the region and China being dominant in economic affairs and engaged in financing investment has become blurred in recent years. Against the background of this larger trend the room to maneuver out of Moscow’s shadow has increased since the full-scale invasion. The lack of explicit support for Russia from Central Asia in times where Russia is actively seeking allies can be equated to subtle criticism of Moscow’s foreign policy. By maintaining neutrality as far as possible Kazakhstan managed to recalibrate its multi-vector foreign policy after a CSTO intervention helped to keep the president in power during a period of domestic unrest just two months prior to the war. The countries recent law on the media is another incremental move to decrease Russian influence. Language politics in Kazakhstan are a complicated issue on their own. Here, it is sufficient to say that every policy promoting Kazakh language at the cost of any other will inevitably be interpreted as a threat to Russian interests and must be designed carefully.
Further, the Central Asian governments pragmatically used the newly gained international attention to interact with global powers in exclusive 5+1 regional formats. The region’s role as a battleground for influence between the West and several autocratic countries has been leveraged by its leaders in what can only be described as a continuation of a multi-vector foreign policy.
At the same time, governments reinforced dependencies on Russia. The primary source of these dependencies varies from country to country. As the headline visit of Putin to Toshkent suggests Uzbekistan is increasingly dependent on Russian energy. Both leaders announced the finalisation of a deal that allows Rosatom to build the first nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan as well as plans to increase the import of Russian oil. The biggest threat to Kazakhstan is sheer geographical proximity and persistent cultural commonalities. A surge in immigration from Russia after the full-scale invasion and threats towards the country’s territorial integrity made it very clear that while it might seem unrealistic now, the Crimea model might still be applied to Northern Kazakhstan. Hence, not offending Russia is a matter of self-preservation for Astana. The recent headlines exemplify the government’s efforts to manage its contradictory relation with its northern neighbour. While welcoming the freedoms mentioned before it severely punishes any suggestion of separatism and continues to make arrests on requests from Russia.
For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the main vulnerability is the economic dependence on remittances generated by labour migration towards Russia. In 2022, the value of remittances in Tajikistan reached 50 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. The aftermath of the terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall has once again amplified the hardships for migrant workers in Russia. It highlighted that stability in Central Asia is susceptibility to external shocks to the flow of remittances.
The best example for the evolution of multi-vector foreign policy in the environment created by Russia’s war are Central Asian policies on transporting dual use goods. Bans on such trade do officially exist but are not practically enforced. This arrangement minimizes the risk of western sanctions while reassuring Russia that the flow of goods will not be interrupted. However, those that profit most are the autocratic governments in Central Asia, both in financial terms and by leveraging their diplomatic position. While they hardly have much strategic choice, maintaining this ambivalence is a proven strategy and may well serve them best in preparing for a world after the war.
