About EU-Ukraine Relations: the Potential of Hungary’s EU Council Presidency 

Hungarian-Ukrainian relations have been grim well prior to 2022. When Hungary vetoed or delayed EU sanctions against Russia or help towards Ukraine, it could be interpreted as a favour for Moscow just as much as a gesture against Kyiv. From Budapest’s perspective, two – or maybe even three - birds with one stone, as such defiance would also provide leverage to Hungary in various Brussels-Budapest disputes. Yet, defining the main drivers behind each opposition would not be so obvious. A quite relevant and imminent event has been causing headache for Ukraine and its EU-allies in the past few months. Meanwhile attempts occurred in favour of its evasion, Hungary is eventually taking over its rotating Council presidency of the EU in the second half of 2024. Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán choose a motto quite quirky, but by no means strange to his political taste: being inspired by Trump’s MAGA, the EU’s slogan will be MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) for the upcoming six months. If looking east, Ukraine has no reason for such optimism – but one can speculate about the content of the occasional Orbán-Zelenskyy conversations

Not unusually, the Orbán-government has been keen on following a shuttlecock diplomacy recently. Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó barely came back from Minsk in late May – where he didn’t miss the opportunity to praise Belarus for its peacebuilding efforts - when he left to attend the annual Economic Forum in Saint-Petersburg. At the same time, Zelenskiyy’s invitation of Hungary to the Swiss peace conference proved to be successful. Szijjártó announced during the SPIEF Hungary’s participation in Switzerland; later in Bürgenstock he also offered to mediate towards Russia, as “the last European country which left communication channels open to Russia”. Meanwhile secretary general Stoltenberg could successfully convince Orbán on his Budapest trip to not to veto for NATO’s Ukraine-mission in exchange for Hungary’s standoff, EU High Representative Josep Borrell was less successful attempting to manage a similar deal for the EU. As a result of Hungary’s further opposition, the EU decided to search for a loophole dismissing the country’s objection when deciding about weapons purchase for Ukraine. The used legal technique is now deemed as a possible solution to resolve complications over the G7’s $50 billion loan plan for Ukraine too. 

It is no surprise that the current presiding country Belgium and other EU leaders rushed to agree on the 14th sanction package before Hungary would take over its role. The Belgian presidency was under high pressure in recent months to end as many sensitive files as possible before July 1, typically ones related to Ukraine. The previous EP composition showed fears in advance of a Hungarian presidency and consequently tried to balk it, or at the very least narrow down the country’s competence. Eventually such limitations did not materialize – timing of the presidency allegedly helped to relieve concerns, as it takes place in the end of the five-year long political and law-making period of the EU. It means that the main task of the incumbent Presidency is to synchronize and oversee the institutional transition following the elections. Yet, some EU diplomats now expect that Orbán might use its presidency to benefit in his bilateral relations with third parties and are wary of a “Russian influence operation via Hungary… ahead of the presidency”. Looking at Hungary’s attitude towards Ukraine since 2022 February such worries are not groundless. 

Good news for Kyiv: Hungary’s latitude won’t be too wide, as rotational presidencies inherently bear more administrative and co-ordinational roles in the Council. Especially now that EU-leaders share an intention to limit the “possible harm Hungary could cause”. Still, presiding countries hold influence over topics to be discussed in the Council. General expectations about the country’s eventual objectives for its upcoming six months vary. Some reckon that Budapest’s main goal is to carry out its presidency smoothly and without any loud scandals, demonstrating proficiency – as Hungarian EU-diplomats themselves go out of their way to stress this. On the other hand, analysts also highlight that the Orbán-government might utilize this period to reinforce its “sand in the machine, stick in the spokes and thorn under the nails” policy fuelled by their aversion towards the EU’s institutional system. Given the limited possibilities, the most Budapest can do is rather symbolic, but will probably affect the Russian-Ukrainian war – and not in favour of the latter.  Afterall, technical proficiency and anti-mainstream gesture politics do not necessarily exclude each other and might mark Hungary’s presidency simultaneously. 

Hopefully and in all likelihood not crucial, but still somewhat bad news for Ukraine: meanwhile EU and Hungarian interests overlap in many topics – including agricultural policy or the defence industry -, the EU’s enlargement policy is not one of them. Ukraine – together with Moldova - just started its formal accession talks with the EU at the end of June but is expected to continue them only in 2025 under the Polish presidency. Although the Hungarian government is a loud advocator of the bloc’s extension, its support refers more for the Western Balkans countries than Ukraine. Similarly, one rather does not expect significant progress in further sanction packages towards Russia or an agreement on the payments worth €6.6 billion intended to send to Ukraine and currently upheld by Hungary. 

Overall, the harm Hungary can make for Ukraine during its presidency lies in its passivity, at best – unless some emergency occurs where Kyiv needs a prompt and firm response from the Union. However, Orbán already defied preliminary expectations and his own statements – which implied support and objection would actually go the other way around - in December when he let the bloc agree on the start of accession talks with Ukraine but vetoed the €50 billion financial aid package to Kyiv. Whether Orbán has something up his sleeve to surprise Europe again – only time will tell. It might depend not only on his (best) intentions, but on the sovereignty of his decisions as well. 

Dóra Poncsák, MSc Student, King's Russia Institute

Undergraduate degree obtained at Corvinus University of Budapest’s International Business Economics Bsc programme, currently studying at King’s Russia Institute. My main interests include public affairs and social-political-economic dynamics in (the authoritarian context of) Russia and Hungary, the relationship between the two countries and its consequences for the EU.

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