Unraveling Connections: Russia’s Private Military Toolbox

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, so-called “private” security companies have become increasingly integral to the Kremlin’s foreign policy strategy. The Wagner Group, particularly while under the leadership of the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, gained significant attention in the Western media during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although Prigozhin met an untimely end at Putin’s behest last year, his former organization, along with other Russian PMC’s, continue to advance the Kremlin’s malign objectives in conflict zones abroad. Recently, the growing visibility of Russian PMCs in parts of western and central Africa has exacerbated frustrations among U.S. and Western policymakers. It is evident that, despite the lessons learned from last year's Wagner rebellion, the Kremlin considers the benefits provided by Wagner and other state-backed PMC organizations too valuable to abandon. Nevertheless, the long-term effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain. 

Since 2014, when Russian PMCs first appeared in supporting roles during the illegal annexation of Crimea, their reach has expanded globally. Between 2014 and 2020, PMC operations expanded into areas of contested influence across Africa, the Middle East, South America, and the Indo-Pacific. During this period, the Wagner Group was the predominant force behind Russia's covert PMC activities. This period also saw Wagner mercenaries' capabilities extend into the various ‘hybrid warfare’ disciplines, encompassing the military, intelligence, economic, informational, and ideological spaces. At the same time, the presentation of the Wagner group as an independent, private entity provided a level of quasi-deniability that would otherwise be absent with more overt forms of statecraft. This defense was invoked by the head of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2021, as the support of Wagner mercenaries was recruited by the Malian military junta.  In addition, the use of the name “Wagner” appears to be an effort to obfuscate potential linkages to the Russian state, though this is a rather thinly veiled attempt. 

Within its areas of operation, the Wagner Group offered security services, paramilitary support, and disinformation campaigns to troubled regimes in exchange for resource concessions, financial backing, and diplomatic assistance. In Libya, Wagner mercenaries joined forces with Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army with ambitions of gaining access to Libya’s oil wealth. In Mali, Wagner's information warfare campaigns leveraged colonial legacies and anti-French sentiment to position itself as an ideal alternative for the new military junta, which sought to distance itself from French influence and address a growing domestic terrorism threat. Only until 2022, the role of the Wagner Group in conflict zones remained relatively clandestine and without the official recognition of the Russian government.  

As Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine stalled with few strategic victories and dwindling troop numbers, the Kremlin turned to directly enlisting Wagner forces at the front lines. Throughout much of 2022 and 2023, Wagner forces emerged as a primary component of Russia’s offensive operations, compensating for the heavy losses sustained by many regular Russian army units in the initial stages of the invasion. Wagner's growth is evident from the start of the war until its peak in mid-2023, when the number of active mercenaries increased tenfold to 50,000 men. It is estimated that over 40,000 of the Wagner recruits were drawn from prisons, alleviating personnel shortages affecting Russian forces at the front without triggering political backlash from high casualties and a prospective ‘full mobilization’ in Russia. As the Kremlin’s focus narrowed to the small, strategically insignificant city of Bakhmut in the winter of 2022-2023, it was Wagner forces that were tasked with the brunt of the operation. The months-long battle which ensued involved more than 78,000 Wagner mercenaries, with 22,000 having been killed by their eventual capture of the city.  

Russia's victory in Bakhmut, achieved with the help of the Wagner Group, was hailed by Russian officials as a success. However, analysts widely regard the outcome as a pyrrhic Russian victory due to the immense losses suffered for minimal strategic gain. For Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the heavy losses sustained during the battle heightened tensions with the Russian Ministry of Defense to a breaking point. His disdain for their leadership spurred frequent tirades published online against senior government leaders, particularly those targeting defense minister Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Tensions escalated until June 23, 2023, when Prigozhin initiated a brief armed assault towards the Russian capital, capturing the southern city of Rostov without resistance before halting the so-called “march for justice” the following day.  Only two months later, Prigozhin was killed under suspicious circumstances alongside other senior Wagner officials when their plane was brought down near Moscow – a likely reprisal from Putin.  

Prigozhin’s mutiny against the Russian Ministry of Defense served as a crucial lesson for the Kremlin about the risks of empowering such a figure with an almost limitless supply of weapons and considerable autonomy. This lesson seems to have been heeded, as the Russian government has since moved to restructure the organization under the direct oversight of the Ministry of Defense's Main Intelligence Directorate. Accordingly, much of the remnants of the Wagner group in Ukraine have been effectively subsumed into other elements of the Russian armed forces such as the Rosgvardia. Others have diffused into other Russian MoD-backed PMCs, such as Redut and Convoy. For Wagner mercenary operations in Africa, however, the Russian MoD continues to see their value toward Russian foreign policy interests in the medium to long-term. This has manifested in the form of its successor organization, now known as “Africa Corps”. For the time being, it seems that evolving African geopolitics are validating this decision. 

Recent developments in Africa’s Sahel region, now colloquially known as the ‘coup belt’ due to a series of coups d'état spanning from the eastern to the western coasts, have created fertile ground for the new Africa Corps to further extend Russian malign influence. In particular, the expansion of mercenary operations into Niger and Burkina Faso appears to demonstrate Russia’s progress in the wake of Wagner’s restructuring. For U.S. policymakers, the arrival of Russian mercenaries in Niger is particularly troubling, as it follows a decade-long U.S.-led counterterrorism operation that included the construction of a $100 million airbase serving as a crucial regional intelligence hub. Mali and Burkina Faso represent similar concerns for France, as French forces have likewise been driven out at least partially in place of Russian mercenaries. While the U.S. and France struggle to maintain their foothold, Russian PMCs are particularly appealing to many military juntas in the Sahel region, as they support permissive arrangements without pressure for democratic reforms or respect for human rights. However, the Russian state engages in these relationships with limited transparency and prioritizes its own self-interest above all else, raising concerns about the long-term implications of its presence in the region. 

Despite the near-catastrophic outcomes of Prigozhin’s 2023 rebellion, it is evident that the Kremlin still views its quasi-PMC groups as highly valuable strategic tools. The lessons learned from 2023 have led to a large-scale transformation and centralization of its PMC groups, yet in Africa, its operations continue to perform and grow as usual. Russia’s deployment of opaque military resources to undermine adversaries and advance its global ambitions underscores the breadth of its objectives beyond Ukraine. This highlights the urgency for Western policymakers to fully comprehend Russia’s broader intentions and effectively counter its revisionist ambitions. Russia’s capacity to cultivate new partnerships in the global south could prolong the conflict in Ukraine, underscoring the need for informed observers to closely monitor Russia’s PMC activities in Africa and beyond.