Georgia’s Election: Transitioning Security in the South Caucasus

Georgia’s population took to the polls during the final weekend of October, with many voters hoping for a democratic change in the government to bolster their strong pursuit of future European integration. However, official results gave the pro-Russian ‘Georgian Dream’ party a 54 percent majority, highlighting the country’s ongoing struggle against high level corruption alongside the extension of its alignment to President Putin’s regime. 

Earlier this year, efforts were made to establish the ‘Georgian Charter’ by President Zourabishvili to encourage Georgia’s move towards the EU, whilst reducing the potential for government officials to use fraudulent activities to strengthen their election success. Strong relations between all four opposition parties was vital in establishing a structured movement against the Georgian Dream party’s ambition to rule similar to those in bordering Russia. The charter provided a list of various legislation, including the removal of pro-Russian laws introduced in the past year. The party’s honorary chairman, and the country’s richest individual, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has used an increased anti-Western rhetoric, ultimately pushing Georgia back into Russia’s sphere of influence. His belief that external forces, being of Western influence, involve themselves in Georgian politics gave the Georgian government the right to remove “foreign agents, who will carry out only the orders of a foreign country”, mimicking laws introduced by Putin’s regime in the early 2010’s.  Therefore, a win for the pro-European and pro-Western parties would have seen a democratic transition for Georgia away from Russian power.  

Following the election, various reports have been published regarding intimidation tactics used by the ‘Georgian Dream’ party to ensure they maintained political power. One report includes an example of men gathering in large groups outside polling stations as a form of intimidation, suggesting to voters that they are under close surveillance and thus threatening the nation’s overall political security. Germany have also accused Russia of conducting bomb threats on foreign polling stations during the Moldovan elections held the week prior, within cities such as Hamburg and Frankfurt. Although these instances are not directly connected, it appears that increasingly authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe are using direct threatening behaviour towards citizens to control election outcomes and increase the power held by the Kremlin in country’s along its borders.  

Ivanishvili’s powerful Georgian government can now implement legislation to expand its focus on fundamental security issues such as energy, adjusting to meet the Russian government’s trade expectations, therefore improving its economic position on the global scale. The South Caucasus region has historically been a meeting point between the Middle East, Europe and Asia, wherein larger powers such as Russia and Turkey have pursued a strong strategy to influence countries in the region. As the West’s isolation of Russia continues, a radical swing taken by the Georgian government in favour of Moscow could expand the nation’s contemporary geo-political position, providing reassurance to Putin’s government for the future of key Russian resources, including oil and gas exports. Russia is Georgia’s second largest trade partner, and saw an increase of almost 22 percent in trade between the countries following the invasion of Ukraine, therefore prompting discussions amongst EU members over possible sanctions on the country. Furthermore, Georgia’s natural gas imports from Russia increased 16.5% in 2023, suggesting a small transition away from the strong dependency held on Azerbaijani natural gas imports, and foreshadowing the improved relations with Putin’s Russia that have been increasingly pursued by the government.  

The Caucasus therefore currently poses a serious security threat to the West and Ukraine’s strategy in reducing Russia’s war efforts. Sanctions had been imposed to economically damage the Russian state; however, Putin’s government has carefully manipulated loopholes within to reduce the effects these have on the Russian economy. Countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus have provided a system for the circumvention of sanctions, where these nations have aided the transportation of key imports such as drones and luxury vehicles, supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. Investigations by local media outlet ‘iFact’ have focused on the various routes of how these goods end up in Russia, and the companies involved in exporting these across the border. Drone equipment exports were used as an example, which can fetch up to 20 times the regular rate, signalling the possibility of bribery. Furthermore, household goods such as washing machines have seen an increased rates in exports, allowing the Russian military to use the technology within these appliances as spares for their aircraft equipment. 

The recent Georgian elections have therefore exposed the continuing transition of security paradigms in the Caucasus, including the strengthening of Russia’s sphere of influence. Democratic values amongst those in Ivanishvili’s ‘Georgian Dream’ party are extremely low, as political and civil freedoms are tormented by foreign agent laws and anti-LGBT laws similar to those implemented by President Putin in Russia. Furthermore, increased trade between the bordering nations signifies blows for the security of Western sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022, bolstering the Russian economy and military along the way, thus threatening Ukraine’s ability to defend itself from the invasion.