The Implications of the Kremlin’s Operation to ‘Honeytrap’ an Irish Member of Parliament
Recently the Sunday Times broke the story that a sitting unnamed Irish left-wing member of parliament was recruited by the Kremlin through the use of a honeytrap in 2019 to incite tensions between Ireland, the United Kingdom and the EU over Brexit talks.
Apparently, the parliamentarian, codenamed ‘Cobalt’, was seduced by a Russian female agent allowing the Russian military intelligence (GRU) to obtain sexually compromising material on the individual. ‘Cobalt’ was notably tasked by the GRU with reaching out to pro-British illegal paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland during the period when complex Brexit negotiations were taking place over how to solve the cross-border trade issues. These paramilitary groups were at the time warning of violent repercussions if a customs border was established between Northern Ireland and Britain.
Even though Irish security services know the identity of ‘Cobalt’, they cannot for legal reasons disclose the identity of this politician to the public. To add to the absurdity, the parliamentarian cannot, at least for the time being, be arrested, as it is unclear whether any laws have been broken and the individual continues to sit in the Irish parliament. Irish authorities have decided to expel Sergey Prokopiev, who was the GRU colonel responsible for recruiting and handling ‘Cobalt’, along with three other GRU spies masquerading as diplomats. In the wake of this incident, another Irish parliamentarian has come forward disclosing that he was also approached by what was likely Russian intelligence and offered to visit Moscow and meet Putin.
Whilst this news is shocking for many, Taoiseach Simon Harris has commented that this “should come as no surprise to anyone”. This fits into a broader issue of Russian spies being highly active in Ireland . The Kremlin is believed to have had up to 40 spies at its peak in recent years in the country. The spies are there because Ireland is strategically important for many reasons including the fact that 13 of the transatlantic internet cables cross Ireland’s Exclusive Economic Zone. In addition, a lot of tech companies, such as Google, Apple and Microsoft, all have their European headquarters in Ireland .
This story also highlights more than anything how widespread Russian hybrid warfare is in Europe, which includes a range of tools such as information warfare and sabotage attacks, and proves most notably how vulnerable Ireland is to such attacks. A former Irish army chief has described Ireland as a “playground” for intelligence activities by the Kremlin because of its “lackadaisical security culture”. Russian security expert Mark Galeotti has commented further that “Ireland doesn’t have a counter-intelligence capability” thus making it “a relatively soft target”. Others have chosen to characterise Ireland as “Europe’s Weakest Link” or “Europe’s Soft Underbelly”.
Ireland’s vulnerability to Russian aggression is not confined to espionage. Ireland does not have any fighter jets and when the Russian Airforce has repeatedly violated Irish airspace, Ireland depends on the assistance of Britain to intercept Russian aircraft. Simultaneously, Ireland barely has a functional navy with only six patrol vessels, of which at times only one is operational due to severe staffing issues. Moreover, none of their vessels have sonar capabilities. As a result, Ireland has again depended on the support of Britain with the Royal Navy heading off a Russian submarine last year from Cork Harbour. Finally, Ireland’s cyber defence capabilities are also believed to be inadequate despite Ireland creating a dedicated National Cyber Security Centre in 2011 to tackle such issues. In 2021, a ransomware cyber-attack was perpetrated against the country’s healthcare system by a Russian criminal gang, which is believed to have cost more than 600 million euros in damage.
Ireland is militarily neutral and not a member of NATO, which has become a justification for its own military and security weakness. Many consecutive governments in Ireland have continuously refused to take the country’s security seriously and defence spending has been reduced since the end of the Cold War. Ireland spends less on defence as a percentage of GDP than any other EU country—just 0.2%. In a hard-hitting government commissioned report from 2022, it was clarified that if Ireland does not step up military spending its armed forces will be “unable to conduct a meaningful defence of the State against a sustained act of aggression”.
However, even after the start of the war in Ukraine, defence budgets have not even kept up with inflation and the only substantial improvement that the Irish government is planning to initiate by 2028 is the purchasing of a primary radar system. Furthermore, the public has long been complacent, while Irish politicians recognise that any effort to fundamentally overhaul the armed and security forces offers little advantage in the polls (McNamara 2022). As the previous Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces, Vice Admiral Mellett has stated, it is “a simple reality whereby the Defence Forces is seen as a cost centre, that it consumes resources, that may well be allocated better elsewhere” (Ibid.). Until that changes, Ireland will still be vulnerable to any form of external aggression whether that be espionage, sabotage or other, and Ireland will continue to be a source of weakness for Europe.
